CRIM2: People VS Lara

PEOPLE VS LARA

GR 171449 October 23, 2006

FACTS:

For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals. On 31 January 1997, appellant Jose D. Lara was charged with Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Robbery in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708, respectively.

The deceased victim, Chito B. Arizala, was a security guard of the Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services. Benjamin Aliño, friend of the victim, testified that at around 6:00 p.m. of January 27, 1997, he met the victim Chito Arizala at the latter’s place of work. Just when Alino was about to leave, a bald man (appellant) arrived and had an argument with Arizala. Without any warning, appellant punched Arizala. When Arizala fell to the ground, his shotgun slid from his shoulder and likewise fell down on the ground. Appellant then immediately grabbed and cocked the shotgun. Appellant could not fire the shotgun since there was a number of people in the area.
Around 6:15 pm , while Nonilio Marfil, another security guard, was at their barracks, Arizala arrived and asked for Marfil’s shotgun because the one assigned to him was grabbed and taken away by appellant. Marfil obliged. Arizala then instructed him and the other security guards to follow him. Thereafter, Arizala went ahead carrying Marfil’s service shotgun. When Arizala reached the corner, Marfil, who was following him, suddenly heard a gunshot and saw Arizala slowly falling to the ground. When he was about to approach Arizala to get the shotgun and to help the latter, he heard another shot. So, he moved back. Immediately thereafter, he saw appellant emerge from behind a concrete wall and take the (second) shotgun that was lying on top of the chest of the fallen victim. He used the second shotgun to fire at Arizala twice.
While the prosecution was in the process of adducing its evidence, appellant escaped from detention. The lower court granted the prosecution’s motion to declare appellant to have waived his right to present evidence and to consider him a fugitive from justice.
On 22 December 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction of Robbery with Homicide (Case No. 97-13706 ) and Robbery (Crim. Case No. 97-13708), but acquitted him for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm (Case No. 97-13707).
Appelant argues that there are glaring inconsistencies with the testimonies of the witnesses. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: 1. WON the testimonies against the accused are reliable?

2. WON the acquittal of the Court of Appeals for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms has basis?

3. WON the accused is guilty of Robbery and Robbery with homicide?

HELD/ RACIO DECIDENDI:
1. The testimonies of the witnesses clearly establish the guilt of appellant as the assailant who took two shotguns from the victim. On top of such damning evidence, no evidence was adduced by the defense because appellant escaped detention, thus waiving his right to do so. Flight is a strong indication of guilt when it is done to escape from the authorities or to escape prosecution

2. We agree with appellant’s acquittal of the charge of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm.
With the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8294 on 6 July 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder is no longer treated as a separate offense, but only as a special aggravating circumstance. Thus, where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be two separate offenses of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Although the killing was committed on 27 January 1997, being favorable to appellant who was not shown to be a habitual delinquent, the amendatory law was properly given retroactive application pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, insofar as it spared appellant a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 has to be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. 97-13707.

3. Appellant is guilty of Murder and two counts of theft.
In the offense of robbery with homicide, the accused must be shown to have the principal purpose of committing robbery, the homicide being committed either by reason of or on occasion of the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. The original design must have been robbery, and the homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct relation to, or must be perpetrated with a view to consummate the robbery.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals that appellant committed the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 97-13706. There is nothing in the records that would show that the principal purpose of appellant was to rob the victim of his shotgun. It must be emphasized that when the victim and appellant met and had a heated argument, the absence of the intent to rob on the part of the appellant was apparent. Appellant’s act of taking the shotgun was not for the purpose of robbing the victim, but to protect himself from the victim. Having failed to establish that appellant’s original criminal design was robbery, appellant could only be convicted of the separate crimes of either murder or homicide, as the case may be, and theft.
Though appellant was charged with robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 97-13706, we find him guilty of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and theft under Article 309 of the same Code. We likewise find that treachery attended the killing. There is treachery in a sudden and unexpected attack which renders the victim unable to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. In the case at bar, the victim was ambushed when he reached the corner of a concrete fence where appellant was waiting.
As regards the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm in a murder or homicide, same cannot also be considered. Inasmuch as the use of an unlicensed firearm is now considered as a special aggravating circumstance which would not merit the imposition of the supreme penalty of death, the same must be specially alleged in the Information. The Information in Criminal Case No. 97-13706 failed to allege this circumstance.
As to Criminal Case No. 97-13708, appellant should only be liable for theft. The fact that appellant took the (second) shotgun from the victim when he was already lying on the ground does not necessarily mean that he committed robbery. It must be remembered that the taking of the second shotgun was intimately connected with the killing of the victim. When appellant waited for the victim to come his way, his intention was evidently to kill and not to rob inasmuch as appellant was not intending to rob the victim of any of his personal belongings, more particularly, a second shotgun. The taking of the second shotgun was clearly an afterthought that arose after he killed the victim.