CRIM 2: Sycip VS CA

SYCIP VS COURT OF APPEALS

GR 125059

March 17, 2000

FACTS:

For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.

On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit. Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48 monthly installments.

After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in the unit and incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarial notices to the effect that he was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance with the project plans and specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). FRC was ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its townhouse project.

Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycip's postdated checks in its possession. Sycip sent "stop payment orders" to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his checking account to avoid paying bank charges every time he made a "stop payment" order on the forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of petitioner's checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC filed a complaint against petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.

On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed with the RTC of Quezon City six Informations charging petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The trial court found petitioner guilty of violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22. Dissatisfied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but the decision of the RTC was upheld

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

HELD/RACIO DECIDENDI:

The instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED of the charges against him under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), ⁹ an offense is committed when the following elements are present:

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

In this case, we find that although the first element of the offense exists, the other elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." But such presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has presented evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of the offense charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable presumption.

Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded, not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then. The checks in this case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. But we find from the records no showing that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment. On the contrary, there is testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checks, he had P150,000,00 cash or credit with Citibank.