CRIM2: Bax VS People

BAX VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 149858

September 5, 2007

FACTS:

Challenged in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the Decision dated December 14, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court declaring petitioner guilty of nine counts of violations of B.P. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

That on or about the 13^th day of March 1994 the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Ilyon Industrial Corporation amounting to P47, 250.

Said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment, which check could have been dishonored for insufficiency of funds had not the accused, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to "Stop Payment", and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of the said check or made arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Except as to the numbers and dates of the other nine checks issued by petitioner, and the reason for their dishonor (drawn against insufficient funds), the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 14355-14363 and the above Information are similarly worded.

The MeTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty as charged of the crime of Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, (10) counts. RTC modified its decision and rendered him guilty of violation of BP 22, (9) counts. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision

Hence the instant petition.

ISSUE: whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner by evidence beyond reasonable doubt

HELD/RACIO DECIDENDI:

We REVERSE the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Francisco M. Bax is acquitted in Criminal Cases Nos. 14355 to 14363 for violations of B.P. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. We find that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is guilty of violations of B.P. 22.

the prosecution must prove the following essential elements of the offense:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.⁶

We find that the prosecution failed to prove the second element.

To hold petitioner liable for violation of B.P. 22, it is not enough that the issued check was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds. It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that he knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the check was issued. Hence, the law provides that he must be notified of the dishonor.

While it is true that ILYON, through its president, Benedict Tan, asked petitioner to pay the dishonored checks, however, such kind of notice is not the one required by B.P. 22.

Under B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually notified in writing that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within five banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper.

Since petitioner did not receive a written notice of dishonor of the checks, obviously, there is no way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. 22 would start and end. Thus, the prima facie evidence of petitioner’s knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the time he issued the checks did not arise.