CRIM2: Bax VS People

BAX VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 149858

September 5, 2007

FACTS:

Challenged in the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the Decision dated December 14, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court declaring petitioner guilty of nine counts of violations of B.P. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

That on or about the 13^th day of March 1994 the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Ilyon Industrial Corporation amounting to P47, 250.

Said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon its presentment, which check could have been dishonored for insufficiency of funds had not the accused, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to "Stop Payment", and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of the said check or made arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Except as to the numbers and dates of the other nine checks issued by petitioner, and the reason for their dishonor (drawn against insufficient funds), the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 14355-14363 and the above Information are similarly worded.

The MeTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty as charged of the crime of Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, (10) counts. RTC modified its decision and rendered him guilty of violation of BP 22, (9) counts. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision

Hence the instant petition.

ISSUE: whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner by evidence beyond reasonable doubt

HELD/RACIO DECIDENDI:

We REVERSE the Decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Francisco M. Bax is acquitted in Criminal Cases Nos. 14355 to 14363 for violations of B.P. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. We find that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is guilty of violations of B.P. 22.

the prosecution must prove the following essential elements of the offense:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.⁶

We find that the prosecution failed to prove the second element.

To hold petitioner liable for violation of B.P. 22, it is not enough that the issued check was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds. It must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that he knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the check was issued. Hence, the law provides that he must be notified of the dishonor.

While it is true that ILYON, through its president, Benedict Tan, asked petitioner to pay the dishonored checks, however, such kind of notice is not the one required by B.P. 22.

Under B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually notified in writing that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within five banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper.

Since petitioner did not receive a written notice of dishonor of the checks, obviously, there is no way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. 22 would start and end. Thus, the prima facie evidence of petitioner’s knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the time he issued the checks did not arise.

CRIM 2: Sycip VS CA

SYCIP VS COURT OF APPEALS

GR 125059

March 17, 2000

FACTS:

For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.

On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit. Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in the amount of P9,304.00, covering 48 monthly installments.

After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in the unit and incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarial notices to the effect that he was suspending his installment payments on the unit pending compliance with the project plans and specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). FRC was ordered by the HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its townhouse project.

Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycip's postdated checks in its possession. Sycip sent "stop payment orders" to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip to close his checking account to avoid paying bank charges every time he made a "stop payment" order on the forthcoming checks. Due to the closure of petitioner's checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC filed a complaint against petitioner for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.

On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed with the RTC of Quezon City six Informations charging petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The trial court found petitioner guilty of violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22. Dissatisfied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but the decision of the RTC was upheld

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of petitioner for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

HELD/RACIO DECIDENDI:

The instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED of the charges against him under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), ⁹ an offense is committed when the following elements are present:

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

In this case, we find that although the first element of the offense exists, the other elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." But such presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has presented evidence to contradict said presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of the offense charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable presumption.

Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be properly funded, not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then. The checks in this case were issued at the time of the signing of the Contract to Sell in August 1989. But we find from the records no showing that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment. On the contrary, there is testimony by petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checks, he had P150,000,00 cash or credit with Citibank.

CRIM2: People VS Juliano

PEOPLE VS JULIANO

G.R. No. 134120

January 17, 2005

FACTS:

This case was certified for review by the Court of Appeals after finding appellant Lea Sagan Juliano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, in Criminal Case No. 2053.

Appellant was charged of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) in Criminal Cases Nos. 2051 and 2052, and Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (d), of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 2053

On July 27, 1991, appellant Lea Sagan Juliano purchased sacks of milled rice worth P89,800 from the complainant JCT. She issued postdated Check, dated July 30, 1991 for P89,800 in payment of the goods. On July 30, 1991, JCT’s acting manager, encashed the check, but the drawee bank refused payment because it was drawn against insufficient funds.

Appellant went to JCT’s office and JCTshowed her the check that bounced. Appellant pleaded that JCT accept two checks to replace the first check that was dishonored, and JCT agreed. JCT encashed the two replacement checks, but they were dishonored by the drawee bank. The bank issued two Check Return Slips indicating that payment was refused because the checks were "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds." JCT sent a demand letterto appellant informing her of the dishonor of the replacement checks. Appellant received the demand letter.

The trial court found that appellant was guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code for issuing the first check, and violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for issuing the two replacement checks. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, Lea Sagan Juliano, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks law, and of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, 2 (d).

Appellant appealed her conviction for Estafa to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court found appellant guilty of the offense.

ISSUE: The accused could not be found guilty of estafa under Article 315, 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused employed deceit constituting false pretenses or any fraudulent act.

HELD/RACIO DECIDENDI:

The decision of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 2053, is set aside and appellant Lea Sagan Juliano is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.

The elements of Estafa are as follows: (1) The offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; (3) the payee has been defrauded. Damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense and must be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction, while the false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to, or simultaneous with, the issuance of the bad check. The drawer of the dishonored check is given three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor to cover the amount of the check, otherwise, a prima facie presumption of deceit arises.

In accepting the two replacement checks and surrendering the first check to appellant instead of demanding payment under the first check on the same day that JCT’s Acting Manager informed appellant of the dishonor of the first check, JCT led appellant to believe that she no longer had to deposit the necessary amount to cover the first check within three days from the verbal notice of dishonor. On July 31, 1991, appellant’s balance in her account with PCIB Isulan Branch was P78,400. It is possible that appellant could have deposited P11,400 to make good the first check worth P89,800 if JCT made it clear that it was demanding payment under the first check.

It would have been different if JCT accepted the replacement checks three days after appellant’s receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor of the first check, because by then theprima facie evidence of deceit against appellant for failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, would have been established.

Under the circumstances of this case, the fact that appellant no longer deposited the amount necessary to cover the first check, within the required period cannot be considered prima facie evidence of deceit against appellant. For it was due to complainant JCT’s own act of accepting the replacement checks and surrendering the first check to appellant that appellant was no longer obliged to deposit the amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor as JCT was no longer holding her liable for payment under the said check.

In failing to prove the element of deceit by appellant, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.

CRIM2: Gonzales VS People of the Philippines

GONZALES VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR 159950
February 12, 2007

FACTS:
For review on certiorari is the Decision dated March 11, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22157, affirming the guilty verdict against petitioner for arson by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 97.
Petitioner Joel P. Gonzales, Jr. was charged in an Information dated July 24, 1997, which read as follows: That on or about the 26th day of June, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire to an inhabited place, to wit: a two-storey residential building which [was] partitioned into dwellings rented out to tenants, thereby setting said residential building into flames and razing it including other properties.
On arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty.
Carlos C. Canlas testified on his way to the room rented by Gonzales, he smelled gas. He saw Gonzales ignite a flame and throw it on a pile of clothes in the middle of the living room where Gonzales had also placed an M-Gas liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tank. Fire quickly spread to the other parts of the building.
On May 28, 1998, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 97 rendered a decision convicting Joel P. Gonzales, Jr. of arson. Gonzales appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision

ISSUE: WHETHER UPON THE AFORESTATED GIVEN SET OF FACTS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED CORRECTLY IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF THE CHARGE OF ARSON

HELD/RATIO DECIDENDI:
Tthe Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the conviction by the RTC finding the accused-petitioner guilty of the crime of arson of an inhabited dwelling is AFFIRMED
The arson committed in the instant case involving an inhabited house or dwelling is covered by Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613. In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction. When these are present, the only issue is the credibility of the witness. Whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the subject.

CRIM 2:Gonzales VS HSBC

GONZALES VS HONGKONG SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATIONS
G.R. 164904 October 19, 2007

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez seeks the dismissal of the complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 115, otherwise known as the “Trust Receipts Law,” in relation to Art 315(1)(b) of the RPC, filed by respondent HSBC.
At the time of the incident, petitioner Gonzalez was the Chairman and CEO of Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation (MLRC). Gonzalez, for and in behalf of MLRC, acknowledged receipt of various golfing equipments and assorted Walt Disney items, and signed the corresponding two Trust Receipt agreements, i.e., Trust Receipt No. 001-016310-205 covering the various golfing equipments, and Trust Receipt No. 001-016310-206 covering the assorted Walt Disney items, both in favor of respondent HSBC.

When the due dates of subject Trust Receipts came and went without word from MLRC, respondent HSBC, demanded from MLRC the turnover of the proceeds of the sale of the assorted goods covered by the Trust Receipts or the return of said goods. Despite demand, however, MLRC failed to return the assorted goods or their value. Consequently, HSBC filed a criminal complaint for estafa, i.e., for violation of Presidential Decree No. 115, the “Trust Receipts Law,” in relation to Art. No. 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gonzalez

Gonzales argues “President (sic) Decree No. 115 must be read in conjunction with Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code under both it is required that the person charged with estafa pursuant to a trust receipt transaction must be proved to have misappropriated, misused or converted to his own personal use the proceeds of the goods covered by the trust receipts to the damage of the entruster.” Respondent HSBC, on the other hand, contends that petitioner is criminally liable since “[f]raud is not necessary for conviction for violation of the Trust Receipts Law,” the latter being in the nature of a malum prohibitum decree.”

ISSUE: whether or not there is probable cause to hold petitioner Gonzalez liable to stand trial for violation of Presidential Decree No. 115, in relation to Art. 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD/ RACIO DECIDENDI:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit

That petitioner Gonzalez neither had the intent to defraud respondent HSBC nor personally misused/misappropriated the goods subject of the trust receipts is of no moment. The offense punished under Presidential Decree No. 115 is in the nature of malum prohibitum. A mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold, constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to another, but more to the public interest. This is a matter of public policy as declared by the legislative authority. Moreover, this Court already held previously that failure of the entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, covered by the trust receipt, to the entruster or to return said goods if they were not disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt shall be punishable asestafa under Art. 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code without need of proving intent to defraud.

CRIM2: People VS Lara

PEOPLE VS LARA

GR 171449 October 23, 2006

FACTS:

For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals. On 31 January 1997, appellant Jose D. Lara was charged with Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Robbery in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708, respectively.

The deceased victim, Chito B. Arizala, was a security guard of the Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services. Benjamin Aliño, friend of the victim, testified that at around 6:00 p.m. of January 27, 1997, he met the victim Chito Arizala at the latter’s place of work. Just when Alino was about to leave, a bald man (appellant) arrived and had an argument with Arizala. Without any warning, appellant punched Arizala. When Arizala fell to the ground, his shotgun slid from his shoulder and likewise fell down on the ground. Appellant then immediately grabbed and cocked the shotgun. Appellant could not fire the shotgun since there was a number of people in the area.
Around 6:15 pm , while Nonilio Marfil, another security guard, was at their barracks, Arizala arrived and asked for Marfil’s shotgun because the one assigned to him was grabbed and taken away by appellant. Marfil obliged. Arizala then instructed him and the other security guards to follow him. Thereafter, Arizala went ahead carrying Marfil’s service shotgun. When Arizala reached the corner, Marfil, who was following him, suddenly heard a gunshot and saw Arizala slowly falling to the ground. When he was about to approach Arizala to get the shotgun and to help the latter, he heard another shot. So, he moved back. Immediately thereafter, he saw appellant emerge from behind a concrete wall and take the (second) shotgun that was lying on top of the chest of the fallen victim. He used the second shotgun to fire at Arizala twice.
While the prosecution was in the process of adducing its evidence, appellant escaped from detention. The lower court granted the prosecution’s motion to declare appellant to have waived his right to present evidence and to consider him a fugitive from justice.
On 22 December 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction of Robbery with Homicide (Case No. 97-13706 ) and Robbery (Crim. Case No. 97-13708), but acquitted him for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm (Case No. 97-13707).
Appelant argues that there are glaring inconsistencies with the testimonies of the witnesses. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: 1. WON the testimonies against the accused are reliable?

2. WON the acquittal of the Court of Appeals for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms has basis?

3. WON the accused is guilty of Robbery and Robbery with homicide?

HELD/ RACIO DECIDENDI:
1. The testimonies of the witnesses clearly establish the guilt of appellant as the assailant who took two shotguns from the victim. On top of such damning evidence, no evidence was adduced by the defense because appellant escaped detention, thus waiving his right to do so. Flight is a strong indication of guilt when it is done to escape from the authorities or to escape prosecution

2. We agree with appellant’s acquittal of the charge of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm.
With the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8294 on 6 July 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder is no longer treated as a separate offense, but only as a special aggravating circumstance. Thus, where an accused used an unlicensed firearm in committing homicide or murder, he may no longer be charged with what used to be two separate offenses of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and qualified illegal possession of firearms used in homicide or murder under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Although the killing was committed on 27 January 1997, being favorable to appellant who was not shown to be a habitual delinquent, the amendatory law was properly given retroactive application pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, insofar as it spared appellant a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 has to be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. 97-13707.

3. Appellant is guilty of Murder and two counts of theft.
In the offense of robbery with homicide, the accused must be shown to have the principal purpose of committing robbery, the homicide being committed either by reason of or on occasion of the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. The original design must have been robbery, and the homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct relation to, or must be perpetrated with a view to consummate the robbery.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals that appellant committed the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 97-13706. There is nothing in the records that would show that the principal purpose of appellant was to rob the victim of his shotgun. It must be emphasized that when the victim and appellant met and had a heated argument, the absence of the intent to rob on the part of the appellant was apparent. Appellant’s act of taking the shotgun was not for the purpose of robbing the victim, but to protect himself from the victim. Having failed to establish that appellant’s original criminal design was robbery, appellant could only be convicted of the separate crimes of either murder or homicide, as the case may be, and theft.
Though appellant was charged with robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 97-13706, we find him guilty of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and theft under Article 309 of the same Code. We likewise find that treachery attended the killing. There is treachery in a sudden and unexpected attack which renders the victim unable to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. In the case at bar, the victim was ambushed when he reached the corner of a concrete fence where appellant was waiting.
As regards the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm in a murder or homicide, same cannot also be considered. Inasmuch as the use of an unlicensed firearm is now considered as a special aggravating circumstance which would not merit the imposition of the supreme penalty of death, the same must be specially alleged in the Information. The Information in Criminal Case No. 97-13706 failed to allege this circumstance.
As to Criminal Case No. 97-13708, appellant should only be liable for theft. The fact that appellant took the (second) shotgun from the victim when he was already lying on the ground does not necessarily mean that he committed robbery. It must be remembered that the taking of the second shotgun was intimately connected with the killing of the victim. When appellant waited for the victim to come his way, his intention was evidently to kill and not to rob inasmuch as appellant was not intending to rob the victim of any of his personal belongings, more particularly, a second shotgun. The taking of the second shotgun was clearly an afterthought that arose after he killed the victim.